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In this paper we analyse public sector efficiency in the new member states of the European 
Union compared to that in emerging markets. After a conceptual discussion of expenditure 
efficiency measurement issues, we compute efficiency scores and rankings by applying a 
range of measurement techniques. The study finds that expenditure efficiency across new EU 
member states is rather diverse especially as compared to the group of top performing 
emerging markets in Asia. Econometric analysis shows that higher income, civil service 
competence and education levels as well as the security of property rights seem to facilitate 
the prevention of inefficiencies in the public sector. 
 
 
Keywords: government expenditure, efficiency, DEA, new EU member states, emerging 
markets. 
 

























The importance of the efficient use of public resources and high-quality fiscal policies 
for economic growth and stability and for individual well-being has been brought to the 
forefront by a number of developments over the past decades. Macroeconomic constraints 
limit countries’ scope for expenditure increases. The member states of the European Union 
are bound to fiscal discipline through the Stability and Growth Pact. Globalisation makes 
capital and taxpayers more mobile and exerts pressure on governments’ revenue base. New 
management and budgeting techniques have been developed and there is more scope for 
goods and service provision via markets. Transparency of government practices across the 
globe has increased, raising public pressure to use resources more efficiently. 
 
Our contribution in this study is essentially threefold: first we discuss and survey 
conceptual and methodological issues related to the measurement and analysis of public 
sector efficiency. Second we construct Public Sector Performance and Efficiency composite 
indicators for the ten new member states that acceeded to the European Union (EU) on 1 May 
2004 as compared to emerging markets from different regions, future EU candidate countries 
and some current EU member countries that show features of emerging markets and/or are 
undergoing a catching up process. Third we use Data Envelopment Analysis to compute input 
and output efficiency scores and country rankings, which we combine with a Tobit analysis to 
see whether exogenous, non-discretionary factors play a role in explaining expenditure 
inefficiencies. To our kowledge, such an efficiency analysis has not been applied before to 
this set of countries. 
 
  The Public Sector Performance and Efficiency composite indicator includes 
information on administrative, education, health, income distribution, economic stability, and 
economic performance outcomes. It is interesting to see that a relatively strong performance 
of the new EU member states on human capital/education and income distribution contrasts 
with a relatively weak one for economic performance and stability. There is no clear pattern 
of distinction between Baltic and Central European countries while the two island countries 
post strong values for all indicators for which data is available. Asian Emerging economies 
performed very strongly on administration, human capital and economic stability and growth. 
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The results of our analysis show that expenditure efficiency across new EU member 
states is rather diverse, especially  compared to the group of top performing emerging markets 
in Asia. From the analysis of composite public sector performance (PSP) and efficiency (PSE) 
scores we find that countries with lean public sectors and public expenditure ratios not far 
from 30% of GDP tend to be most efficient. PSE scores of the most efficient countries are 
more than twice as high as those of the poorest performers. 
 
From the DEA results we see that a small set of countries define, or are very close to, 
the theoretical production possibility frontier: Singapore, Thailand, Cyprus, Korea, and 
Ireland. From an input perspective the highest ranking country uses 1/3 of the inputs as the 
bottom ranking one to attain a certain public sector performance score. The average input 
scores suggest that countries could use around 45 per cent less resources to attain the same 
outcomes if they were fully efficient. Average output scores suggest that countries are only 
delivering around 2/3 of the output they could deliver if they were on the efficiency frontier. 
 
Finally we examine via Tobit analysis the influence of non-discretionary factors, 
notably non-fiscal variables, on expenditure efficiency. Our analysis suggests that the security 
of property rights, per capita GDP, the competence of civil servants, and the education level 
of people positively affect expenditure efficiency. Due to significant correlation, however, the 
two competence/education variables are only significant in separate regressions while the 
other two variables are robust over all specifications. International trade openness, trust in 
politicians and transparency of the political system have not been found to display a 
significant influence on expenditure efficiency (even though only the coefficient for public 
















The importance of the efficient use of public resources and high-quality fiscal policies 
for economic growth and stability and for individual well-being has been brought to the 
forefront by a number of developments over the past decades. Macroeconomic constraints 
limit countries’ scope for expenditure increases. The member states of the European Union 
are bound to fiscal discipline through the Stability and Growth Pact. Globalisation makes 
capital and taxpayers more mobile and exerts pressure on governments’ revenue base. New 
management and budgeting techniques have been developed and there is more scope for 
goods and service provision via markets. Transparency of government practices across the 
globe has increased, raising public pressure to use resources more efficiently (see also Tanzi 
and Schuknecht (2000), Heller (2003), Joumard, Konsgrud, Nam and Price (2004)). 
 
The adequate measurement of public sector efficiency is a difficult empirical issue and 
the literature on it, particularly when it comes to aggregate and international data, is rather 
scarce. The measurement of the costs of public activities, the identification of goals and the 
assessment of efficiency via appropriate cost and outcome measures of public policies are 
very thorny issues. Academics and international organisations have made some progress in 
this regard by paying more attention to the costs of public activities via rising marginal tax 
burdens and by looking at the composition of public expenditure. Moreover, they have been 
shifting the focus of analysis from the amount of resources used by ministry or programme 
(inputs) to the services delivered or outcomes achieved (see, for instance, OECD (2003), 
Afonso, Ebert, Thöne and Schuknecht, (2005), and Afonso, Schuknecht and Tanzi (2005)). 
 
Our contribution in this study is essentially threefold: first we discuss and survey 
conceptual and methodological issues related to the measurement and analysis of public 
sector efficiency. Second we construct Public Sector Performance and Efficiency composite 
indicators for the ten new member states that adhered to the European Union (EU) on 1 May 
2004 as compared to emerging markets from different regions, future EU candidate countries 
and some current EU member countries that show features of emerging markets and/or are 
undergoing a catching up process.
1 Third we use Data Envelopment Analysis to compute 
input and output efficiency scores and country rankings, which we combine with a Tobit 
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analysis to see whether exogenous, non-discretionary (and non-fiscal) factors play a role in 
explaining expenditure inefficiencies.
2 To our kowledge, such an efficiency analysis has not 
been applied before to this set of countries. 
 
On the second and third objective, the study finds significant differences in 
expenditure efficiency across new member countries with the Asian newly industrialised 
economies performing best and the new member states showing a very diverse picture. The 
econometric study shows that income, public sector competence and education levels as well 
as the security of property rights seem to facilitate the prevention of inefficiencies in the 
public sector. 
 
The paper is organised as follows. In section two we discuss conceptual issues 
regarding public expenditure efficiency. In section three we present the methodologies used 
for the measurement of public expenditure efficiency. Section four reports stylised facts 
regarding the new EU member states and various ways for assessing public sector efficiency: 
via i) performance and efficiency analysis based on cross-country composite indicators, ii) a 
non-parametric efficiency analysis, and iii) an explanation of inefficiencies via non-
discretionary factors. Section five concludes. 
 
II. Measuring efficiency in public expenditure: conceptual issues 
 
Economists are concerned about the efficient use of scarce resources. The concept of 
efficiency finds a prominent place in the study of the spending and taxing activities of 
governments. Economists believe that these activities should generate the maximum potential 
benefits for the population and they castigate governments when, in their view, they use 
resources inefficiently. International organisations, such as the World Bank and the IMF, 
often express concern about governmental activities that they consider inefficient or 
unproductive. 
 
Like the proverbial elephant, efficiency or, more often inefficiency, is easier to 
recognize than to define objectively and precisely. Merriam Webster reminds us that 
                                                           
2 See also Gupta and Verhoeven (2001), Clements (2002), St. Aubyn (2003), Afonso, Schuknecht, and Tanzi 
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efficiency has to do with the comparison between input, and output or between costs and 
benefits. At a given input, the greater the output, the more efficient an activity is. A machine 
is efficient when, at a given cost, it produces the largest possible output. For example, a 
furnace is efficient when it produces a good amount of heat at a given cost. A car is efficient 
when it goes a good number of miles with a gallon of gasoline. 
 
The measurement of efficiency generally requires: (a) an estimation of costs; (b) an 
estimation of output; and (c) the comparison between the two. Applying this concept to the 
spending activities of governments, we can say that public expenditure is efficient when, 
given the amount spent, it produces the largest possible benefit for the country’s population.  
Here the word benefit is used because economists often make a distinction between output 
and outcome, a distinction to which we shall return later. 
 
Often efficiency is defined in a comparative sense: the relation between benefits and 
costs in country A is compared with that of other countries. This can be done for total 
government expenditure, or for expenditure related to specific functions such as health, 
education, poverty alleviation, building of infrastructures and so on. If in country A the 
benefits exceed the costs by a larger margin than in other countries, then public expenditure in 
country A is considered more efficient. 
 
The simple comparison outlined above requires that both costs and benefits be 
measured in acceptable ways. This is easy, or easier, for machines (cars, furnaces) but 
difficult for governmental activities. It is often difficult to measure the benefits from a 
governmental expenditure. But, one could assume that, at least the costs (i.e., the resources 
used) should be easy to determine. Unfortunately, this is not always so. Deficient budgetary 
classifications, lack of reliable data, difficulties in allocating fixed costs to a specific function, 
and failure to impute some value to the use of public assets used in the activity can also 
hamper the determination of real costs. 
 
II.1. Measuring costs 
 
A problem that arises from the comparison of, say, the efficiency of a car or a furnace 
with that of public spending is that additional amounts of inputs such as gasoline, petroleum 
or electricity can normally be bought by a consumer at the same price as previous amounts. In 
9
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other words it is possible to assume a perfectly elastic supply curve for the input used by an 
individual. This, however, is not the case for public spending. Public spending is financed by 
tax revenue and more revenue can be obtained only at progressively higher marginal costs. 
 
It is a well established conclusion, supported by both theory and empirical work, that, 
once a tax administration is in place, the marginal cost of tax revenue is generally higher than 
the average cost, and that marginal costs can increase rapidly. This is true in all countries but 
perhaps more so in emerging markets and developing countries. These countries face great 
difficulties in establishing good and efficient tax systems. As a consequence, they must often 
rely on revenue sources that impose: (a) dead weight costs, because of the distortions and the 
disincentives that they impose on the economy; (b) high costs for the countries’ tax 
administrations; and (c) high compliance costs for the taxpayers. Thus, the true cost to the 
economy of the marginal dollar collected in taxes can significantly exceed the dollar received 
by the government.  The assumption of a perfectly elastic supply curve for tax revenue is not 
tenable. 
 
Each additional dollar of spending, requiring an additional dollar of revenue, will 
impose additional and rising marginal costs on the economy unless that dollar comes from 
reducing some other spending. The concept of efficiency in public spending must take this 
into account. Both the level of taxation and the quality of the tax system should become 
essential elements for the evaluation of the efficiency of public spending. This is quite apart 
from whether the use to which the tax revenue is put is efficient or not. An analysis that 
focused only on the use of revenue would be missing these important aspects. 
 
A simple graphical presentation can explain more formally this important, obvious, 
but often-ignored point. It is made ignoring, for the time being, the efficiency in the actual use 
of the tax revenue. The focus, here, is on the efficiency in the tax collection side. 
 
In Figure 1, the vertical axis measures both the benefits from public expenditure to the 
country’s population and the costs imposed by the taxes collected. It is assumed that the same 
unit of measurement can be used to measure both. The vertical axis reflects total benefits from 
public expenditure and total costs of taxation. These costs include, in addition to the monetary 
payment made by the citizens’ dead weight costs, administrative costs, and compliance costs. 
10
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When the tax administration is corrupt, they include also bribes paid by the taxpayers to the 
corrupt tax administrators. 
 





The budgetary or monetary value of public expenditure and the tax revenue to cover 
the expenditures are both measured, in dollars, on the horizontal axis. More public 
expenditure is supposed to bring more benefits to the population. Thus the curve is positively 
sloped. However, the marginal benefit from each additional dollar spent can be expected to 
fall as more dollars are spent. Thus, the curve that reflects total benefits is concave downward, 
i.e., its second derivative is negative. Curve OVB in Figure 1 describes this behaviour. 
 
As more taxes are collected, each additional dollar collected becomes more costly. 
Therefore, the curve, OSC, describing the total costs of taxation is concave upward, i.e., its 
second derivative is positive. 
 
At a level of public expenditure equal to OR, the slopes of the two curves are equal 
which means that the true cost of the last dollar spent is exactly equal to the benefit created by 
that spending. Before point R, increasing tax revenue and public spending increases net 
benefits which are measured by the vertical distance of the two curves.  Beyond point R, the 
marginal cost of taxation exceeds the marginal benefits from spending. VS is the largest 
vertical distance between the two curves. Thus the optimal level of public expenditure is OR. 
11
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There are other reasons why the budgetary costs of an activity can underestimate the 
true costs of the activity. We shall mention two such reasons. The first is that most 
governments do not consider in their budgetary estimates of the costs of particular activities 
(education, defence, etc.) the opportunity costs of using government-owned assets such as 
buildings, land, forests and so on. For example the budgetary cost of a school includes the 
costs of teachers’ salaries, school equipment and so on but it often does not include the rental 
value of the government-owned building used. The same is true for the cost of jails, for the 
cost of military bases, to name a couple of examples. This means that the budgets, and 
especially those for particular categories of spending, often, and at times substantially, 
underestimate, the true costs of these activities.
3  
 
Still another reason for the underestimation of the costs of particular activities is the 
difficulty of allocating government fixed costs among the particular activities. When, for 
example, the educational budget is considered in relation to the benefits from the spending, 
that budget will not include any part of the fixed costs of running a government. These costs 
for example should include parts of the activities of parliaments, the president’s office and so 
on. 
 
II.2. Efficiency with wrong goals 
 
It is difficult to recognize in the analysis of efficiency in public expenditure  that 
expenditure can be efficient in a technical sense –  i.e. the goal pursued is pursued at low cost 
– but nevertheless can be inefficient in the sense of  public interest or social welfare. This 
occurs when the government efficiently produces the wrong output. This is the classic case of 
guns versus butter. A government may be producing public defence efficiently but it may be 
producing too much of it (too many guns) and too little of other social goods (health, 
education) compared to what the population would prefer to have. 
 
This is clearly a political problem. In a democratic society that operates well with 
checks and balances at the political level, the executive branch, under the control of a 
democratically elected parliament, determines the size and the composition of the budget. 
This budget can be assumed to reflect legitimately the goals of the population.  In this case, 
                                                           
3 A discussion of this point is contained in Tanzi and Prakash (2003). 
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the main question is the technical one of how efficiently the money assigned to each function 
is being spent. Thus, we could talk about technical inefficiency and not about political, or goal 
related, inefficiency. 
 
Unfortunately, much of the world is not made up of well functioning democracies.  
The problem of “state capture” is a common one and one that has received much attention on 
the part of the World Bank. But even when “state capture” is not a problem, powerful lobbies 
and corruption can divert the budget towards goals that are not identical with those that would 
reflect the public interest. In these situations the definition of efficiency becomes less clear.  
 
In conclusion it is important to recognize the distinction between producing the wrong 
output (i.e. allocating the budget to the wrong activities) but spending the money in a 
technically efficient (i.e. low cost) way; and allocating the budget to the right activities (i.e. so 
much for health, so much for education, etc) but doing it in an inefficient (i.e. high cost) way. 
Both of these problems are common and important, and both lead to inefficiency in the use of 
resources. Unfortunately in many situations one finds both problems, that is, the wrong output 
is produced and it is produced in an inefficient way. 
 
II.3. Efficiency with right goals 
 
In the previous sub-section we have discussed the possibility that, for various reasons, 
the budget gets distorted towards goals (defence, etc.) that the majority of the population may 
see as lower priorities than socio-economic goals such as health, education, support for poor 
groups, high growth and so on. Suppose, however, that the budget allocates proportions that 
may be considered appropriate toward popular expenditures such as health and education. UN 
Guidelines have at times recommended that governments allocate specific proportions of their 
budgets to particular social functions. In these situations various problems may arise that 
would tend to make the public spending less efficient than it could be. Let us mention some of 
these problems. 
 
First, a problem similar to the one mentioned in the previous section is the hijacking of 
the expenditure for the specific benefit of special pressure groups. For example educational 
spending may be redirected from primary education towards secondary or tertiary education 
or from scientific subjects toward law, finance and so on; health spending may be diverted 
13
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from prevention to hospital care; or from rural to urban areas; or from basic health to modern 
hospitals in big cities; or the resources may be allocated from diseases that affect mostly 
poorer people, such as malaria toward old people or “higher income” diseases. These 
redirections within a budgetary category are often important in determining the benefits that 
come out from the expenditure for a basic function; they are important in determining 
efficiency even when they do not change the total amounts spent for the category. 
 
Second, and a problem that has attracted little attention, is the administrative hijacking 
of the budgeted resources by the provider of the services. For certain public functions and 
especially for those that are labour-intensive, such as education and health, the role of the 
providers of the services, (school teachers, administrators, doctors, nurses and so on) is 
fundamental. Unlike cash transfers (as for the payment of pensions) that are received directly 
by the legal beneficiaries, much of the actual spending for activities such as education and 
health goes to the salaries of the public employees that provide the services. In exchange for 
the salaries received these employees are supposed to produce an output in the form of 
services that benefit patients, school children and other users in terms of good health, more 
literacy, more human capital and so on. 
 
There has been a tendency among economists to measure the output or the benefit in 
these activities on the basis of the budgeted allocation:  the higher the expenditure, the higher 
the benefit. For example calls to allocate a given, or a larger, share of national budgets to 
health and education assume the identity between expenditure and benefits.  The larger the 
expenditure, the greater the benefits received by the intended destinatories are assumed to be. 
But, as argued already by Tanzi a long time ago (1974) the two can be widely different. This 
difference is central to the concept of efficiency. 
 
Health, education and similar activities absorb a large share of the government payroll 
and the personnel who work for the government. Through high salaries they can absorb a 
large share of the budget allocated to these activities thus leaving little for ancillary needs. 
This is especially the case when those who work in these activities (school teachers, doctors, 
nurses) are well organized politically. If mostly higher salaries absorb additional resources 
allocated to these activities and the higher salaries are not accompanied by higher productivity 
of the public employees, the higher public spending can be unproductive and produce little 
additional benefits to the students or patients. This may happen even in presumably well-run 
14
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countries. For example, Aninat at al. (1999) referred to the Chilean experience where a 
tripling of the real public spending on health over a few years did not produce any visible or 
measurable increase in the quantity or quality of the services to those who used the public 
health system. The increase in spending simply resulted in rents for the doctors and/or nurses. 
In other countries large increases in educational spending had little impact on educational 
output. 
 
In connection with the above point we need to return to the question of the distinction 
between output and outcome. This distinction should be fundamental in the analysis of the 
efficiency of public spending. There is often much attention paid to the outputs of certain 
activities and too little to the outcomes. For example the outputs of educational spending may 
be school enrolments, or number of students completing a grade. The outputs of health 
expenditure may be the number of operations performed or days spent in a hospital bed.  
However, the outcomes should be based on how much students learned and how many 
patients got well enough to return to a productive life. 
 
Third, corruption in its various forms has a deleterious effect on public expenditure 
efficiency or productivity. Corruption may be linked to the existence of ghost workers, i.e. 
individuals who receive a salary from the government but who never show up on the job; or, 
in some extreme cases, are literally inexistent. It may be linked to individuals who have 
double jobs and who spend as little time and energy at the government job as possible. It may 
be linked to individuals who often do not show up in their jobs claiming illness or some other 
reasons. It may be linked to the assignment of incompetent individuals in sensitive jobs or to 
overstaffing and nepotism, and so on. There is little question that corruption and inefficiency 
are often two sides of the same coin so that reduction of corruption becomes a sine qua non 
for an increase in efficiency. However, the effect of corruption is more likely to be noted in 
outcomes then in outputs of public spending. 
 
Finally, what we call inefficiency may be the result of cultural factors, such as attitude 
toward work; climatic factors, that make it difficult to work in certain periods, such as 
summers, afternoons, etc.; traditions, such as number and length of religious holidays, and so 
on. These factors may generate what, borrowing a term from the economic development 
literature, could be called an X-inefficiency factor, which is difficult to define and measure 
but which exists nevertheless and is likely to play a significant role. 
15
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III. Measuring efficiency in public expenditure: methodologies 
III.1. Composite indicators for measuring public sector performance and efficiency 
 
In recent years various attempts have been made at measuring the efficiency of public 
expenditure via composite indicators. These attempts are of two broad types: macro 
measurements, and micro measurements. Macro measurements aim at estimating the 
efficiency of total public spending.  Micro measurements aim at measuring the efficiency of 
particular categories of public spending. These methods try to make progress in tackling the 
most important measurement challenges: they aim to identify appropriate objectives, they 
measure outcomes of public sector activities that proxy these objectives (rather than inputs), 
and they set these in relation to the costs (expenditure and taxes). 
 
  Macro measurements have as their aim an evaluation of public spending in its entirety.  
In other words they attempt to measure, or rather to get some ideas of, the benefits from 
higher public spending. When, for example, Sweden spends 1 ½ times as much in terms of 
GDP shares as Switzerland, what does it get in return? Micro measurements attempt to 
determine the relationship between spending and benefits in a particular budgetary function or 
even sub-function (i.e., health spending or the efficiency of spending in hospitals, or spending 
for protection against malaria, aids, etc.). 
 
  A first and simple macro measurement attempt was made by Tanzi and Schuknecht 
(1997, 2000) in trying to assess the benefits from total public spending in 18 industrialized 
countries. The approach attempts to determine whether larger public spending in these 
industrialized countries provided returns, in terms of some identifiable benefits, that could 
justify the additional costs, including the limitation in individual economic freedom 
associated with higher tax burdens, imposed by that additional spending. The key question 
that it tries to address is whether there is a positive, identifiable relationship between higher 
public spending and higher social welfare. 
 
  This approach is a comparative method which uses data on various socio-economic 
indicators that are available for groups of countries. The countries are classified in terms of 
the level of (or the increase in) public expenditure. Then public spending is related to the 
16
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values of, or the changes in, the socio economic indicators. The greater the positive impact of 
higher spending on the indicators, the more efficient public expenditure is assumed to be.   
  
The application of this method led the authors to conclude that additional public 
expenditure had not been particularly productive in recent decades. The group of countries 
with lower levels of public spending had socio-economic indicators that were as good as or at 
times better than the countries with much higher spending levels.
4  
  
  Afonso, Schuknecht, and Tanzi (2005) refined this approach and built composite 
indicators of public sector performance. They distinguished public sector performance (PSP), 
defined as the outcome of public policies, from public sector efficiency, defined as the 
outcome in relation to the resources employed. This is also the first method we apply to the 
new member and emerging market analysis later in the paper.  
 
  Assume that public sector performance (PSP) depends on the values of certain 
economic and social indicators (I). If there are i countries and j areas of government 








ij i PSP PSP
1
, (1) 
with  ) ( k ij I f PSP = . 
 
Therefore, an improvement in public sector performance depends on an improvement 
in the values of the relevant socio-economic indicators: 
 













PSP .     (2) 
  
The performance indicators are of two kinds: process or opportunity indicators, and traditional 
or Musgravian indicators. As a first step, they defined seven sub-indicators of public 
                                                           
4 For industrialized countries there is also no apparent relationship between the level of public spending and the 
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performance. The first four look at administrative, education, health and public infrastructure 
outcomes. Each of these sub-indicators can contain several elements. For example, 
“administrative” includes indicators for corruption, red tape, quality of judiciary, and the 
shadow economy. These are averaged to give the value for “administrative” performance. 
Health includes infant mortality and life expectancy etc. A good public administration, a 
healthy and well-educated population, and a sound infrastructure could be considered a 
prerequisite for a level playing field with well-functioning markets and secure property rights, 
where the rule of law applies, and opportunities are plenty and in principle accessible to all. 
These indicators thereby try to reflect the quality of the interaction between fiscal policies and 
the market process and the influence this has on individual opportunities. 
 
The three other sub-indicators reflect the “Musgravian” tasks for government.
5 These 
try to measure the outcomes of the interaction with, and reactions to, the market process by 
government. Income distribution is measured by the first of these indicators. An economic 
stability indicator illustrates the achievement of the stabilisation objective. The third indicator 
tries to assess allocative efficiency by economic performance. Once again each of these 
traditional indicators may be made up of various elements. For example stability is made up 
of variation in output around a trend and inflation. Finally all sub-indicators are used to 
compute a composite public sector performance indicator by giving the sub-indicators equal 
weights. The values are normalized and the average is set equal to one. Then the PSP of each 
country is related to this average and deviations from this average provide an indication of the 
public sector performance of each of country.   
 
However, these performances reflect outcomes without taking into account the level of 
public spending. They ignore the costs in terms of public expenditure. To get some values of 
public sector efficiency (PSE), the public sector performance (PSP) is weighted by the 
relevant category of public expenditures.      
 
We weigh performance (as measured by the PSP indicators) by the amount of relevant 
public expenditure that is used to achieve a given performance level. In order to compute 
these so-called efficiency indicators, public spending was normalised across countries, taking 
the average value of one for each of the six categories specified above. To get some values of 
                                                           
5 The conceptual separation between “opportunity” and standard “Musgravian” indicators is of course somewhat 
artificial as, for example, health and education indicators could also be seen as indicators of allocative efficiency.  
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public sector efficiency (PSE) the public sector performance (PSP) is weighted by the public 

























The input measures for opportunity indicators are: 
 
(1) Public consumption as proxy for input to produce administrative outcomes (explained 
later in section IV.2.1); 
(2) Health expenditure (for health performance/outcome indicators); 
(3) Education expenditure (for education performance). 
 
Our earlier study also included a measure of the outcome of public investment, but due to a 
lack of comparable data, this measure is not used in this study. 
 
Inputs for the standard or “Musgravian indicators” are: 
 
(1) Transfers and subsidies as proxies for input to affect the income distribution; 
(2) Total spending as proxy for the input to affect economic stabilization (given that larger 
public sectors are claimed to make economies more stable);
6 and 
(3) Total spending also as a proxy input for economic efficiency and the distortive effects of 
taxation needed to finance total expenditure. 
 
However, there are some caveats: it is not easy to accurately identify the effects of 
public sector spending on outcomes and separate the impact of public spending from other 
                                                           
6 For a differing view on the limits of the stabilising effect of growing government, see Cuaresma, Reitschuler 
and Sillgoner (2005) and Buti and van den Noord (2003). 
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influences. Moreover, comparing expenditure ratios across countries implicitly assumes that 
production costs for public services are proportionate to GDP per capita.
7  
 
III.2. Non-parametric analysis of performance and efficiency 
 
Some recent papers have used non-parametric approaches for measuring relative 
expenditure efficiency across countries. One such approach is the Free Disposal Hull (FDH) 
analysis.
8 This analysis is broadly based on the concept of X-efficiency advanced by 
Leibenstein (1966). In the words of Gupta and Verhoeven (2001), the “...central premise of 
the FDH Analysis is...that a producer is relatively inefficient if another producer uses less or 
an equal amount of input to generate more or as much output.”  
  
An alternative non-parametric technique that has recently started to be applied to 
expenditure analysis is Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA). This technique, which is applied 
also later in this study, was originally developed and applied to firms that convert inputs into 
outputs (Coelli, Rao and Battese (1998) and Sengupta (2000)  for a number of applications). 
The term “firm”, sometimes replaced by the more encompassing term “Decision Making 
Unit” (henceforth DMUs) may include non-profit or public organisations, such as hospitals, 
universities, local authorities, or countries.  
 
  The DEA methodology, originating from Farrell’s (1957) seminal work and 
popularised by Charnes, Cooper and Rhodes (1978), assumes the existence of a convex 
production frontier.
 9 The production frontier in the DEA approach is constructed using linear 
programming methods. The term “envelopment” stems from the fact that the production 
frontier envelops the set of observations.
10 
                                                           
7 See Afonso, Schuknecht, and Tanzi (2005) for a discussion of the several caveats of such approach. 
8 These approaches also often suffer from the logical fallacy of “post hoc non est propter hoc”.  They attribute 
the outcomes or the benefits to the expenditure when other factors may have contributed to these outcomes or 
benefits.  For example, effects from changing diets may be attributed to expenditure on health. In addition, many 
of these approaches suffer from the difficulty of distinguishing output from outcomes. For an overview of the 
FDH analysis see for instance Tulkens (1993). 
9 Deprins, Simar, and Tulkens (1984) first proposed the FDH analysis which relaxes the convexity assumption 
maintained by the DEA model.  
10 Technical efficiency is one of the two components of total economic efficiency. The second component is 
allocative efficiency and they are put together in the overall efficiency relation: economic efficiency = technical 
efficiency × allocative efficiency. A DMU is technically efficient if it is able to obtain maximum output from a 
set of given inputs (output-oriented) or is capable to minimise inputs to produce the same level of output (input-
oriented). On the other hand, allocative efficiency reflects the DMUs ability to use the inputs in optimal 
proportions. Coelli et al. (1998) and Thanassoulis (2001) offer introductions to DEA, while Simar and Wilson 
(2003) and Murillo-Zamorano (2004) are good references for an overview of frontier techniques. 
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  Regarding public sector efficiency, the general relationship that we expect to test  
can be given by the following function for each country i: 
 
  ) ( i i X f Y = , i=1,…,n   (5) 
 
where we have Yi – a composite indicator reflecting our output measure; Xi – spending or 
other relevant inputs in country i. If ) ( i i x f Y < , it is said that country i exhibits inefficiency. 
For the observed input level, the actual output is smaller than the best attainable one and 
inefficiency can then be measured by computing the distance to the theoretical efficiency 
frontier.  
 
The purpose of an input-oriented example is to study by how much input quantities 
can be proportionally reduced without changing the output quantities produced. Alternatively, 
and by computing output-oriented measures, one could also try to assess how much output 
quantities can be proportionally increased without changing the input quantities used. The two 
measures provide the same results under constant returns to scale but give different values 
under variable returns to scale. Nevertheless, and since the computation uses linear 
programming not subject to statistical problems such as simultaneous equation bias and 
specification errors, both output and input-oriented models will identify the same set of 
efficient/inefficient producers or DMUs.
11 
 
  The analytical description of the linear programming problem to be solved, in the 
variable-returns to scale hypothesis, is sketched below for an input-oriented specification. 
Suppose there are k inputs and m outputs for n DMUs. For the i-th DMU, yi is the column 
vector of the inputs and xi is the column vector of the outputs. We can also define X as the 
(k×n) input matrix and Y as the (m×n) output matrix. The DEA model is then specified with 
the following mathematical programming problem, for a given i-th DMU: 
12 
 
                                                           
11 In fact, and as mentioned namely by Coelli et al. (1998), the choice between input and output orientations is 
not crucial since only the two measures associated with the inefficient units may be different between the two 
methodologies. 
12 We simply present here the equivalent envelopment form, derived by Charnes et al. (1978), using the duality 
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  In problem (6), θ is a scalar (that satisfies θ≤1), more specifically it is the efficiency 
score that measures technical efficiency. It measures the distance between a country and the 
efficiency frontier, defined as a linear combination of the best practice observations. With 
θ<1, the country is inside the frontier (i.e. it is inefficient), while θ=1 implies that the country 
is on the frontier (i.e. it is efficient). 
 
 The  vector  λ is a (n×1) vector of constants that measures the weights used to 
compute the location of an inefficient DMU if it were to become efficient. The inefficient 
DMU would be projected on the production frontier as a linear combination of those weights, 
related to the peers of the inefficient DMU. The peers are other DMUs that are more efficient 
and are therefore used as references for the inefficient DMU.  1 n  is a n-dimensional vector of 
ones. The restriction  1 ' 1 = λ n  imposes convexity of the frontier, accounting for variable 
returns to scale. Dropping this restriction would amount to admit that returns to scale were 
constant. Notice that problem (4) has to be solved for each of the n DMUs in order to obtain 
the n efficiency scores. 
 
  Figure 2 illustrates a one input and one output example with variable and constant 
returns to scale DEA frontiers for four countries: A, B, C, and D. The variable returns to scale 
frontier unites the origin to point A (not shown in Figure 2), and then point A to point C. The 
vertical axis and the horizontal axis represent respectively the output (some performance 
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Figure 2 – Example of DEA frontiers 
 
 
For instance, country D may be considered inefficient, in the sense that it performs 
worse than country C. The latter achieves a better status with less expense. A similar 
reasoning applies to country B. On the other hand, countries A or C do not show as inefficient 
using the same criterion. 
 
  The constant returns to scale frontier is represented in Figure 4 as a dotted line. In 
this one input – one output framework, this frontier is a straight line that passes through the 
origin and country A, where the output/input ratio is higher. Under this hypothesis, only one 
country is considered as efficient. In the empirical analysis that follows, a priori conceptions 
about the shape of the frontier were kept to a minimum and the constant returns to scale 
hypothesis is never imposed. 
 
III.3. Using non-discretionary factors to explain inefficiencies 
 
The analysis via composite performance indicators and DEA analysis have assumed 
tacitly that expenditure efficiency is purely the result of discretionary (policy and spending) 
inputs. They do not take into account the presence of “environmental” factors, also known as 
non-discretionary or “exogenous” inputs. However, such factors may play a relevant role in 
determining heterogeneity across countries and influence performance and efficiency. 
Exogenous or non-discretionary factors can have an economic and non-economic origin.  
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As non-discretionary and discretionary factors jointly contribute to country 
performance and efficiency, there are in the literature several proposals on how to deal with 
this issue, implying usually the use of two-stage and even three-stage models.
13 Using the 
DEA output efficiency scores computed in the previous subsection, we will evaluate the 
importance of non-discretionary factors below in the context of our new member and 
emerging market sample. We will undertake Tobit regressions by regressing the output 
efficiency scores, δι, on a set of possible non-discretionary inputs, Z, as as follows 
 
  i i i Z f ε δ + = ) ( .   (7) 
 
Previous research on the performance and efficiency of the public sector and its 
functions that applied non-parametric methods mostly used either FDH or DEA and find 
significant inefficiencies in many countries. Studies include notably Gupta and Verhoeven 
(2001) for education and health in Africa, Clements (2002) for education in Europe, St. 
Aubyn (2003) for education spending in the OECD, Afonso, Schuknecht, and Tanzi (2005) 
for public sector performance expenditure in the OECD, Afonso and St. Aubyn (2005a, b) for 
efficiency in providing health and education in OECD countries. De Borger at al. (1994), De 
Borger and Kerstens (1996), and Afonso and Fernandes (2006) find evidence of spending 
inefficiencies for the local government sector. Some studies apply both FHD and DEA 
methods. Afonso and St. Aubyn (2005b) undertook a two-step DEA/Tobit analysis, in the 
context of a cross-country analysis of secondary education efficiency. 
 
IV. A quantitive assessment of public sector performance and expenditure efficiency 
IV.1. Some stylised facts for the EU new member states and comparative countries 
 
As a first step of our quantitative analysis, we will provide some stylised facts i) about 
expenditure levels and composition, and ii) about the relation between total expenditure and 
the level of economic development and economic growth. This will help gauge the situation 
of the new EU member countries and comparable industrialised and emerging market 
countries from a broader, global perspective. 
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The country sample which will be used in the efficiency analysis includes the ten EU 
new member states, (Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, 
Poland, Slovak Republic, and Slovenia); two candidate countries, (Bulgaria, and Romania); 
three “old” member countries that underwent a catching up process after entering the EU, 
(Greece, Ireland and Portugal); and finally nine countries that can also be considered as 
emerging markets, (Brazil, Chile, Korea, Mauritius, Mexico, Singapore, South Africa, 
Thailand, and Turkey). The selection of countries was determined by the search for a 
sufficient number of countries which can be compared with the new EU members and for 
which reasonably good quality data is available so that an expenditure efficiency analysis 
becomes meaningful. In addition, we will make occasional references to comparative 
indicators for OECD or EU countries and country averages. 
 
  Table 1 illustrates total expenditure and the public expenditure composition across the 
sample countries, on an average basis for the period 1999-2003 (or within this period according 
to data availability). First, it is striking that the new EU member countries on average report 
similar total spending as the “old” EU members and much higher spending than most other 
emerging markets. When looking for relatively small governments with spending ratios of less 
than 40% of GDP, we only find the Baltic countries belonging to this group. Second, the 
divergence in expenditure ratios is enormous ranging from about 18% to 50% of GDP. The 
Baltics’ relatively low spending ratio is about one quarter less than that of the central European 
countries but it is significantly higher than the average for the Asian emerging economies 
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Brazil 46.6  19.5  17.1  8.2  1.9  4.6  3.3 
Bulgaria 38.6  17.3  15.2  3.2  3.4  3.4  4.0 
Chile 24.4  12.6  7.9  1.2  2.7  3.8  2.4 
Cyprus 40.0  18.0  11.0  3.3  3.0  5.6  2.5 
Czech Republic  40.6  22.7 15.0  1.2  3.4 4.0  6.2 
Estonia 36.4  19.7  10.7  0.3  4.1  6.2  4.4 
Greece 48.6  16.8  17.0 7.2  3.8  3.7 5.1 
Hungary 50.2  22.4  15.0  4.6  3.8  4.8  5.3 
Ireland 33.0  14.8  9.3  1.7  3.8  4.4  4.9 
Korea 24.4  12.7      5.4 3.8  2.4 
Latvia 36.6  21.4  12.7  0.9  1.3  5.8  3.5 
Lithuania 33.3  20.3  11.1  1.5  2.6  5.9  4.5 
Malta 45.0  20.7  14.5  3.8  4.4  4.8  6.2 
Mauritius 24.7  12.9    3.8  7.5  3.8  2.1 
Mexico 25.3  11.7  5.2  4.6  3.8  4.6  2.6 
Poland 43.2  17.9  17.9  2.8  3.3  5.1  4.2 
Portugal 46.2  20.7  14.3  3.1  3.7  5.7  6.2 
Romania 33.7  15.7  13.7  2.3  1.9  3.4  3.8 
Singapore 21.0  11.4  8.7  0.8    1.4 
Slovak Republic  43.8  20.0  14.2  3.5  2.9  4.1  5.2 
Slovenia 42.1  20.2  18.6  2.3  2.9    6.0 
South Africa  26.3  18.4    4.5  2.7  5.7  3.6 
Thailand 17.8  11.2      7.7 5.3  2.3 
Turkey  42.7  13.8  21.3  4.6  3.5  4.0 
Average 36.0  17.2  13.1  3.9  3.7  4.6  4.0 
Max 50.2  22.7  18.6  21.3  7.7  6.2  6.2 
Min 17.8  11.2  5.2  0.3  1.3  3.4  1.4 
New EU members  41.1  20.3  14.1  2.4  3.2  5.2  4.8 
Baltic countries  35.4  20.5 11.5  0.9  2.7 6.0  4.1 
Other new EU  43.5  20.3  15.2  3.1  3.4  4.7  5.1 
Asian NIC  21.0  11.8  8.7  0.8  6.6  4.6  2.0 
Other NIC  32.8  15.2  11.8  6.1  3.5  4.1  3.2 
OECD 1990s 8/  46.5  19.8  15.1    3.0  5.4  6.2 
 
1/, 2/, 3/, 4/, 5/ - Average for 1999-2003, source: IMF World Economic Outlook (WEO), and AMECO.  
6/ Average for 1998-2001, source: World Bank, WDI 2003. 
7/ Average for 1998-2002, source: World Bank, WDI 2003. 
8/ Source: Afonso, Schuknecht and Tanzi (2005) for OECD 1990s. 
Note: columns 2 through 5 report economic expenditure categories, and that the last two columns report 
functional expenditure categories. 
 
  When looking at the expenditure composition, there are further major differences. But 
these differences are much more pronounced for less productive spending categories. Small 
government countries tend to spend equally as much, or even significantly more, on productive 
spending such as investment and education as the rest of the sample countries. New members 
report public consumption around 20% of GDP, twice as much as Asian emerging economies, 
with the reverse relation holding for public investment where new members spend roughly 3% of 
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GDP while the Asian countries report an average above 6% of GDP. Data on transfers and 
subsidies is more sketchy but huge differences are noteworthy: large welfare states of similar 
size as in the old EU members predominate in many of the new member countries (with the 
Baltics’ featuring somewhat lower expenditure) while such spending in Asian emerging 
economies is only fractional. When looking at education, differences across country groups are 
much smaller than for total spending. New members, old EU members and other emerging 
markets are not far apart from each other. In health, differences are again very significant where 
central European countries spend almost 2 and half times as much in % of GDP as the Asian 
emerging economies. 
 
  To further improve our picture of the expenditure situation in the sample countries, we 
look at per capita GDP as a proxy for the level of economic development and the total 
expenditure ratio. Figure 3 provides the evidence. It is interesting to see that the group of poorer 
new member states has roughly the same level of per-capital income as most emerging markets. 
Korea, the richest new member states and the poorest old EU members (Greece and Portugal) 
also report similar per-capita income. Singapore and Ireland would today already fall into the 
broader category of industrialised countries after rapid catching up over the past decade. 
 
  More relevant for the purpose of this study, however, is to look at expenditure ratios 
relative to per-capita income (industrialised country data is included for reference). The stylised 
facts confirm that the size of government in the new member countries is much larger than in 
some of their emerging market peers and only the Baltics fall into the group of countries with 
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AUS – Australia; AUT – Austria; BEL – Belgium; BGR – Bulgaria; BRA – Brazil; CAN –Canada; CHL – 
Chile; CYP – Cyprus; CZE – Czech Republic; DEN – Denmark; EST – Estonia; FIN – Finland; FRA – France; 
GER – Germany; GRC – Greece; HUN – Hungary; ICE – Iceland; IRL – Ireland; ITA – Italy; JAP – Japan; 
KOR – Korea; LTU – Lithuania; LVA – Latvia; MEX – Mexico; MLT – Malta; MUS – Mauritius; NDL – 
Netherlands; NOR – Norway; NZE - New Zealand; POL – Poland; PRT –Portugal; ROM – Romania; SGP – 
Singapore; SPA – Spain; SVK - Slovak Republic; SVN – Slovenia; SWE – Sweden; SWZ – Switzerland; THA 
– Thailand; TUR – Turkey; UK – United Kingdom; US – United States; ZAF – South Africa. 
 
A key question that is frequently asked is whether such large public sectors in the new 
member states hurt growth? Alternatively, it has also been asked whether the small public 
sectors in several of the emerging markets are detrimental to development if basic services 
and safety nets are not provided. This is an empirical question to which there is so far no clear 
answer, as illustrated in Figure 4. Per capita growth has been relatively buoyant in recent 
years in the small government emerging markets, ranging from two to nine percent per 
annum. This shows that low spending is no obstacle to high growth and the prioritisation on 
productive spending may also contribute to this picture. Data for the new member states also 
suggests that high spending is not necessarily detrimental to growth either. Annual growth 
averaged between two and six percent for this country group in recent years. Productive 
public spending and other factors such as the boost from impending EU accession may have 
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Source: WEO. See country names in Figure 4. 
 
 The picture might change slightly when not looking at the best linear fit (which is a 
slightly downward sloping line as indicated). The best overall fit would probably be an 
inverted U that has its maximum somewhere in the low 30 percent of GDP expenditure range. 
Indeed, there is illustrative evidence of a negative relation between rising public expenditure 
and economic growth from about this range, as we get a correlation coefficient of -0.56 when 
we correlate public spending-to-GDP ratios against real GDP growth for all countries with 
public spending above 30 percent of GDP. Though very tentative, this would confirm earlier 
presumptions by the authors that optimum spending for growth might be much lower in many 
new member and recent emerging market countries. 
 
IV.2. Public sector performance and efficiency via composite indicators 
 
  In measuring public sector performance and efficiency, we follow closely the 
methodology described above (as developed by Afonso, Schuknecht and Tanzi (2005)). In 
summary, our analysis suggests that new EU member countries show an average performance 
score that, due to relatively high expenditure, does not suggest very efficient use of public 
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IV.2.1. Public sector performance (PSP) 
 
As regards public sector performance we have deviated in a few respects from our earlier 
study. In the absence of reasonable data on public infrastructure we in particular focus on only 
three of the four opportunity indicators and the three respective Musgravian indicators. Figure 




Figure 5 – Total public sector performance (PSP) indicator 
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14 The choice of indicators is slightly different from that used in Afonso, Schuknecht, and Tanzi (2005). In 
addtion to omitting public infrastructure, education is reflected only by a qualitative measure of education 
achievement (leaving out secondary school enrolment) and economic performance excludes the level of per-
capita GDP (which in this sample would strongly bias in favour of the rich countries). 
30
ECB
Working Paper Series No. 581
January 2006 
  We compile performance indicators from the various indices giving an equal weight 
to each of them and the results are reported in Table 2.
15 The results for public sector 
performance show some interesting patterns, with an overall very diverse picture for the new 
EU member states. Starting with the overall PSP indicator, the best performers seem to be 
Singapore, Cyprus and Ireland. Other Asian emerging economies and Malta follow this group 
of top performers while most new EU member countries and Portugal and Greece post a 
broadly average performance. Brazil, Bulgaria and Turkey are placed at the bottom end. The 
size of government per se appears to be a too crude instrument of differentiation, when 
looking at the score for large public sector countries. 
 




















Brazil  0.88 0.80 0.96 0.63 0.43 0.77  0.75 
Bulgaria  0.80 1.09 0.99 1.17 0.06 0.31  0.74 
Chile  1.12 0.86 1.03 0.69 0.92 1.02  0.94 
Cyprus   1.12  1.04  1.59  1.54  1.33 
Czech Republic  1.00  1.14  1.02 1.19 0.74 0.74  0.97 
Estonia  1.25 1.11 0.99 1.00 0.57 0.88  0.97 
Greece 0.95  1.04  1.04  1.07 1.67 0.76 1.09 
Hungary  1.09 1.16 1.00 1.21 0.97 0.88  1.05 
Ireland  1.17 1.11 1.03 1.02 1.64 1.47  1.24 
Korea  1.04 1.08 1.01 1.09 1.00 1.60  1.14 
Latvia  1.03 0.98 0.98 1.08 0.76 0.88  0.95 
Lithuania  0.98 1.12 1.00 1.08 0.37 0.84  0.90 
Malta  1.11 1.03 1.04    1.45 1.12  1.15 
Mauritius  0.91 0.86 1.00    1.40 1.08  1.05 
Mexico  0.80 0.71 1.00 0.75 0.38 1.41  0.84 
Poland  0.92 1.08 1.01 1.09 0.83 0.81  0.96 
Portugal  1.11 0.88 1.03 0.98 1.30 0.91  1.04 
Romania  0.63 1.13 0.98 1.10 0.18 0.63  0.78 
Singapore  1.39 1.16 1.05 0.92 2.94 1.71  1.53 
Slovak  Republic  0.95 1.07 1.01 1.28 1.09 0.77  1.03 
Slovenia  1.07 1.13 1.03 1.14 1.35 0.99  1.12 
South  Africa  1.00 0.66 0.80 0.65 1.23 0.50  0.81 
Thailand  1.03 0.99 0.97 0.93 0.94 1.54  1.07 
Turkey  0.77 0.75 0.97 0.93 0.17 0.82  0.74 
Average  2/  1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00  1.00 
Max  1.39 1.16 1.05 1.28 2.94 1.71  1.53 
Min  0.63 0.66 0.80 0.63 0.06 0.31  0.74 
New  EU  countries  0.99 1.06 1.00 1.09 0.74 0.86  0.96 
Baltics  1.06 1.10 1.02 1.14 0.93 0.95  1.03 
Other  new  EU 0.95 1.05 1.00 1.08 0.66 0.82  0.93 
Asian  NIC  1.11 1.00 1.00 0.93 1.76 1.44  1.21 
Other  NIC  0.97 0.91 0.98 0.87 0.96 1.08  0.98 
1/ Each sub-indicator contributes 1/6 to total indicator. 2/ Simple averages. 
                                                           
15 The relevant time period for the several sub-indicators varies a little according to the availability of data but is 
essentially reported to 2001/2003 with some variables being used as an average of longer time spans (see the 
Annex for the precise periods). 
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When comparing the results for the best performers in this study with those from our 
earlier study on industrialised OECD countries, it is noteworthy that Ireland was “only” an 
average performer. Portugal and Greece which are near-average in this group were amongst 
the weakest in the former study. The results hence show that public sector performance is on 
average still somewhat lower in most new EU member countries and emerging markets than 
in the “old” industrialised countries but a few of them (notably the new member island 
countries and Asian Emerging economies) have broadly caught up. 
 
  With regard to sub-indicators, it is interesting to see that the relatively strong 
performance of the new EU member states on human capital/education and income 
distribution contrasts with a relatively weak one for economic performance and stability. 
There is no clear pattern of distinction between Baltics and Central European countries while 
the two island countries post strong values for all indicators for which data is available. Asian 
Emerging economies performed very strongly on administration, human capital and economic 
stability and growth. Overall performance was very equal as regards health indicators.  
IV.2.2. Public sector efficiency (PSE) 
  
  Public sector performance must be set in relation to the inputs used in order to gauge 
the efficiency of the state. We compute indicators of Public Sector Efficiency (PSE), taking 
into account the expenditure related to each sub-indicator as described in section III.1. PSE 
indicators are presented in Table 3 where, due to data limitations for the pre-1998 period in 
many countries, averages of the corresponding expenditure item were used for the relatively 
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Brazil  0.78 0.81 1.15 0.48 0.33 0.59 0.69 
Bulgaria  0.79 1.49 1.00 1.01 0.06 0.29 0.77 
Chile  1.53 1.04 1.70 1.15 1.37 1.51 1.38 
Cyprus   0.92  1.66  1.44  1.39  1.08 
Czech Republic  0.76  1.31  0.66 1.04 0.66 0.66 0.85 
Estonia  1.09 0.83 0.91 1.21 0.57 0.87 0.91 
Greece 0.97  1.32  0.83  0.83 1.23 0.56 0.96 
Hungary  0.83 1.12 0.75 1.05 0.70 0.63 0.85 
Ireland  1.36 1.18 0.84 1.44 1.79 1.61 1.37 
Korea  1.40 1.31 1.72    1.47 2.36 1.65 
Latvia  0.82 0.79 1.14 1.11 0.75 0.87 0.91 
Lithuania  0.83 0.88 0.90 1.27 0.40 0.90 0.86 
Malta  0.92 0.99 0.68    1.16 0.90 0.78 
Mauritius  1.21 1.04 1.91    2.04 1.58 1.56 
Mexico  1.18 0.72 1.52 1.90 0.55 2.01 1.31 
Poland  0.89 0.98 0.97 0.80 0.69 0.68 0.83 
Portugal  0.92 0.71 0.66 0.90 1.01 0.71 0.82 
Romania  0.69 1.53 1.03 1.05 0.20 0.68 0.86 
Singapore  2.09  2.90  1.38  5.05  2.94  2.39 
Slovak  Republic  0.82 1.23 0.77 1.18 0.90 0.64 0.92 
Slovenia  0.91  0.68  0.81  1.15  0.84  0.88 
South  Africa  0.93 0.54 0.89    1.69 0.68 0.95 
Thailand  1.58 0.86 1.68    1.91 3.11 1.83 
Turkey  0.96 0.99 0.98    0.15 0.69 0.63 
Average  3/  1.06 1.03 1.16 1.03 1.14 1.15 1.09 
Max  2.09 1.53 2.90 1.90 5.05 3.11 2.39 
Min  0.69 0.54 0.66 0.48 0.06 0.29 0.63 
New  EU  countries  0.87 1.05 0.87 1.04 0.64 0.77 0.84 
Baltics  0.86 1.00 0.78 1.16 0.75 0.81 0.83 
Other  new  EU  0.88 1.07 0.91 1.00 0.59 0.76 0.84 
Asian  NIC  1.63 0.95 2.16 1.38 3.00 2.54 1.93 
Other  NIC  1.10 0.95 1.32 0.96 1.11 1.29 1.13 
 
1/ These indicators are the expenditure weighted “counterparts” of the indicators of Table 1. 
2/ Each sub-indicator contributes equally to the total indicator. 
3/ Simple averages. 
 
The results for measuring public sector efficiency show an accentuation of the 
findings for public sector performance. This suggests that more public spending often has 
relatively low returns as regards improved performance (which is consistent with the findings 
of our earlier study for industrialised countries). Most low performers, including most new 
EU member states range between 0.8 and 0.9 and Cyprus is the only new member country 
with an average PSE score. Countries with a small government sector post a higher PSE score 
than the average (and hence even more so than the countries with “big” governments). The 
emerging countries of Asia plus Mauritius have most of the highest scores as their good 
performance is achieved with low public spending. 
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  When looking at sub-indices, the new member states efficiency scores are near 
average on human capital and on income distribution. In all other areas, PSE scores are well 
below average for the new EU member states. Note also that the income distribution 
efficiency score is highest in the countries with smaller welfare states. This confirms findings 
elsewhere that welfare programmes in (rich and) poor countries are often poorly targeted and 
benefit those with special interests rather than those in need (Alesina (1998) and Schuknecht 
and Tanzi (2005)). 
 
  All in all the results suggest that efficiency differs enormously across countries. In the 
new member states, a relatively average performance (PSP scores) in most countries is 
“bought” with too many inputs so that efficiency (PSE) is low. In the next section, we will 
analyse whether these findings are confirmed by using a DEA approach. 
 
IV.3. Relative efficiency analysis via a DEA approach 
 
We used a DEA approach as described above, using as our output measure the PSP 
composite indicator reported in Table 2 and as an input measure the total government 
spending as a ratio of GDP. Table 4 presents both the input and the output oriented efficiency 
coefficients of the variable returns to scale analysis while the constant returns to scale 
coefficients are also reported for completeness. 
  
The results largely confirm the findings of the earlier “macro” approach of 
determining efficiency of the public sector. New member states are ranked between 9 and 24 
on input scores and between 3 and 18 on output scores, hence reflecting rather diverse and 
often below average efficiency. Two countries that also had amongst the top PSE scores are 
located on the frontier: Singapore and Thailand. Korea, Chile and Mauritius come next. 
Brazil, Greece and Hungary find themselves at the bottom of the list while most new member 
states fill the middle ranks. From an input perspective the highest-ranking country uses 1/3 of 
the input that the bottom ranking one uses to attain a certain PSP score. The average input 
score of 0.55 hints to the possibility that, for the level of output they are attaining, countries 
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From an output perspective, the top performer achieves twice as much output as the 
least efficient country with the same input. The average output score of 0.67 implies that on 
average, for the level of input they are using, the countries are only obtaining around 2/3 of 
the output they should deliver if they were deemed efficient. 
Table 4 – DEA results: one input, one output 
 
Input oriented  Output oriented  Country 
VRS  TE Rank VRS  TE Rank 
CRS TE 
Brazil  0.381 22 0.488 22  0.219 
Bulgaria  0.461 14 0.483 23  0.262 
Chile 0.730  4  0.615  17  0.529 
Cyprus 0.489  11  0.867  3  0.454 
Czech Republic  0.439 15 0.637 13 0.329 
Estonia  0.489 12 0.632 14  0.364 
Greece 0.369  23  0.713 8  0.307 
Hungary 0.355  24  0.687  9  0.287 
Ireland  0.576 8 0.813 4  0.517 
Korea  0.749 3 0.743 6  0.639 
Latvia  0.486 13 0.624 16  0.357 
Lithuania 0.535  9  0.588  18  0.370 
Malta 0.408  19  0.753  5  0.350 
Mauritius 0.721  5  0.686  10  0.583 
Mexico 0.703  6  0.551  19  0.456 
Poland  0.412 18 0.627 15  0.304 
Portugal  0.385 21 0.678 11  0.308 
Romania  0.528 10 0.509 21  0.316 
Singapore  1.000 1 1.000 1  1.000 
Slovak  Republic  0.406 20 0.674 12  0.322 
Slovenia 0.431  16  0.731  7  0.364 
South Africa  0.676  7  0.529  20  0.421 
Thailand  1.000 1 1.000 1  0.822 
Turkey  0.416 17 0.482 24  0.236 
Average 0.548    0.671   0.422 
Minimum 0.355   0.482    0.219 
Standard dev.  0.186    0.144    0.186 
  CRS TE – constant returns to scale technical efficiency. 
  VRS TE – variable returns to scale technical efficiency. 
 
Figure 6 presents the theoretical production possibility frontier associated with the 
aforementioned set of DEA results. It shows how far the distance is between the bulk of 
countries and the most efficient ones. Nevertheless, there are still very marked differences 
between the top, medium and bottom performers inside the production possibility frontier. To 
get a clearer picture of differences when abstracting from the best performer we treat 





Working Paper Series No. 581
January 2006 



































0.0 10.0 20.0 30.0 40.0 50.0 60.0












BGR – Bulgaria; BRA – Brazil; CHL – Chile; CYP – Cyprus; CZE – Czech Republic; EST – 
Estonia; GRC – Greece; HUN – Hungary; IRL – Ireland; KOR – Korea; LTU – Lithuania; LVA – 
Latvia; MEX – Mexico; MLT – Malta; MUS – Mauritius; POL – Poland; PRT – Portugal; ROM – 
Romania; SGP – Singapore; SVK - Slovak Republic; SVN – Slovenia; THA – Thailand; TUR – 
Turkey; ZAF – South Africa.  
 
When recomputing the DEA scores in a one input and one output framework without 
Singapore, the results are somewhat less dramatic and make more countries “feel good” about 
their public sector (see Table 5 and Figure 7). The corresponding theoretical production 
possibility frontier now includes Thailand and Cyprus while Korea and Ireland are almost on 
the frontier. These countries’ efficiency scores are equal to, or very close to, unity while they 
ranged from 0.49 to 0.87 before (except Thailand which was also at unity). New EU member 
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Table 5 – DEA results: one input, one output (excluding Singapore) 
 
Input oriented  Output oriented  Country 
VRS  TE Rank VRS  TE Rank 
CRS TE 
Brazil  0.381 22 0.562 22  0.267 
Bulgaria  0.461 15 0.564 21  0.319 
Chile  0.730 5 0.823 8  0.644 
Cyprus  1.000 1 1.000 1  0.553 
Czech Republic  0.439 16 0.735 15 0.401 
Estonia  0.489 13 0.753 13  0.443 
Greece 0.407  19  0.822 9  0.374 
Hungary  0.355 23 0.792 10  0.349 
Ireland  0.997 3 0.999 3  0.629 
Korea  0.976 4 0.994 4  0.778 
Latvia  0.486 14 0.742 14  0.435 
Lithuania  0.535 10 0.720 18  0.450 
Malta  0.555 9 0.868 6  0.427 
Mauritius  0.721 6 0.914 5  0.709 
Mexico 0.703  7  0.730  16  0.556 
Poland  0.412 18 0.723 17  0.370 
Portugal  0.385 21 0.782 11  0.374 
Romania  0.528 11 0.621 20  0.385 
Slovak  Republic  0.406 20 0.777 12  0.393 
Slovenia 0.526  12  0.843  7  0.443 
South Africa  0.676  8  0.693  19  0.512 
Thailand  1.000 1 1.000 1  1.000 
Turkey  0.416 17 0.555 23  0.287 
Average 0.591    0.783   0.482 
Minimum 0.355   0.555    0.267 
Standard dev.  0.219    0.137    0.174 
 
  CRS TE – constant returns to scale technical efficiency. 
  VRS TE – variable returns to scale technical efficiency. 
 
The results also show that input scores have not changed that much for most countries. 
This is because the lowest spending country, Thailand, also has a PSP score higher than most 
sample countries. Hence for these countries, input efficiency did not change. Only those with 
higher performance are now assessed relative to the other countries on the production 
possibility frontier and post a higher input efficiency score. The average increased from 0.55 
to 0.59. As regards output efficiency, changes are more substantial if the reference point for 
countries with large public sectors is not any more Singapore but Cyprus, Ireland and Korea. 
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BGR – Bulgaria; BRA – Brazil; CHL – Chile; CYP – Cyprus; CZE – Czech Republic; EST – 
Estonia; GRC – Greece; HUN – Hungary; IRL – Ireland; KOR – Korea; LTU – Lithuania; LVA – 
Latvia; MEX – Mexico; MLT – Malta; MUS – Mauritius; POL – Poland; PRT – Portugal; ROM – 
Romania; SVK - Slovak Republic; SVN – Slovenia; THA – Thailand; TUR – Turkey; ZAF – 
South Africa.  
 
The above calculations could be seen as an approximation of potential direct costs of 
inefficiency in the provision of public services. However, indirect costs, implying a higher 
loss for consumer welfare should also be taken into account. This is outside the scope of our 
paper, but Afonso and Gaspar (2005) address this issue. 
 
  We can now compare the results of our composite indicator analysis of performance 
and efficiency with that of DEA analysis. Table 6 reports DEA input and output efficiency 
scores and ranks (as shown in Table 4) together with PSE scores (from Table 3) and ranks. 
The two methods provide rather similar results as reflected in very high correlation 
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Table 6 – Comparison of country scores and ranks across methods 
 
 
DEA Analyis  Public Sector 
Efficiency (PSE) 
Input oriented  Output oriented     Country 
Score Rank Score Rank Score Rank 
Brazil   0.381  22  0.488  22  0.69  23 
Bulgaria   0.461  14  0.483  23  0.77  22 
Chile    0.73  4 0.615  17 1.38  5 
Cyprus   0.489  11  0.867  3  1.08  8 
Czech Republic   0.439 15 0.637 13  0.85  17 
Estonia   0.489  12  0.632  14  0.91  12 
Greece   0.369  23  0.713 8  0.96  9 
Hungary   0.355  24  0.687  9  0.85  17 
Ireland   0.576  8  0.813  4  1.37  6 
Korea   0.749  3  0.743  6  1.65  3 
Latvia   0.486  13  0.624  16  0.91  12 
Lithuania    0.535 9 0.588  18 0.86  15 
Malta   0.408  19  0.753  5  0.78  21 
Mauritius    0.721 5 0.686  10 1.56  4 
Mexico    0.703 6 0.551  19 1.31  7 
Poland   0.412  18  0.627  15  0.83  19 
Portugal   0.385  21  0.678  11  0.82  20 
Romania   0.528  10  0.509  21  0.86  15 
Singapore   1  1  1  1  2.39  1 
Slovak Republic   0.406  20  0.674  12  0.92  11 
Slovenia   0.431  16  0.731  7  0.88  14 
South  Africa    0.676 7 0.529  20 0.95  10 
Thailand   1  1  1  1  1.83  2 
Turkey   0.416  17  0.482  24  0.63  24 
Correlation  Score Rank Score Rank       
DEA input-PSE  0.91  0.77  -  -      
DEA output-PSE  -  -  0.71  0.56       
 
IV.4. Explaining inefficiencies via non-discretionary factors 
 
As a final step, we extend our analysis to exogenous factors that explain expenditure 
efficiency (see section III.3 for methodical issues). It is probably reasonable to conjecture that 
expenditure efficiency depends on the “technology” applied in the public sector, on factors 
that influence the ability of private agents to protect their resources from public claims, on the 
monitoring capacities of public and private agents, and on international constraint. The 
variables and underlying hypotheses we test are the following:  
 
i)  Secondary school enrolment. This variable aims to proxy the level of education of 
the population in a given country. More educated people are hypothesized to be 
better able to monitor the activities of politicians and bureaucrats and ultimately 
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sanction crass inefficiency. But more education is also likely to imply better 
educated and trained (and hence more efficient) civil servants.  
ii)  The competence of the civil (survey results presented in the Global 
Competitiveness Report, see Annex for sources and explanations). This variable 
aims to measure greater productivity and efficiency in the public sector through 
better training etc. It is expected to be correlated with the education variable. 
iii)  Per capita GDP. This variable aims to proxy the physical capital stock which 
facilitates an efficient production of public goods and services but which may also 
facilitate monitoring of policy makers.  
iv)  An indicator of property rights. Secure property rights make it more difficult for 
governments to extract wealth/rents from the private sector. They also facilitate 
holding governments accountable for their actions.  
v)  Trade openness (exports and imports as a share of GDP). This indicator proxies 
the degree of international competition over labour and capital that would penalise 
public inefficiency disproportionately.  
vi)  Transparency in public policy. This is another indicator that should measure the 
ease of monitoring public officials.  
vii)  Other more direct indicators of political accountability (such as civil liberty, 
political rights or checks and balances) do not show much variation for this 
country group as almost all of them are in the top group. 
 
Exogenous factors could also include other factors that could be detrimental or 
favourable to efficiency (such as the climate, the cultural background) for which economically 
meaningful hypotheses are less readily available. We do not include such variables in our 
analysis. 
 
  Using the DEA output efficiency scores computed in the previous subsection, we now 
evaluate the importance of non-discretionary inputs via Tobit regressions where output 
efficiency scores are regressed on our choice of exogenous, non-discretionary factors. Table 7 
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  Table 7 – Censored normal Tobit results 
(dependent variable: output efficiency scores from Table 5) 
 
  1 2 3 4 5 
































 0.003  *** 
(2.60) 
   
Trade openness      2.46E-04 
(0.46) 
  
Public trust in 
politicians 





     0.010 
(0.42) 
ε σ ˆ   0.081 0.086 0.083 0.081 0.083 
Nº  of  observations  20 20 20 20 16 
 
ε σ ˆ  – Estimated standard deviation of ε. 
The z statistics are in brackets. 
*, **, *** - Significant at the 10, 5 and 1 per cent level respectively.  
 
The Tobit analysis suggests that the security of property rights, per capita GDP, the 
competence of civil servants, and the education level of people positively affect expenditure 
efficiency. Due to significant correlation, however, the two competence/education variables 
are only significant in separate regressions while the other two variables are robust over all 
specifications. International trade openness, trust in politicians and transparency of the 
political system have not been found to display a significant influence on expenditure 
efficiency (even though only the coefficient for public trust in politicians had the wrong sign). 




In this paper we analysed public sector efficiency in the new member states of the 
European Union as compared to emerging markets. We start with a conceptual discussion of 
expenditure efficiency measurement issues where challenges regarding the measurement of 
costs, the definition of goals and the measurement of outcomes are significant. Taking these 
challenges into account, we calculate efficiency scores and rankings by applying a range of 
measurement techniques to the new EU member countries and a selection of emerging 
markets, catch-up economies, and EU candidate countries.  
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The results of our analysis show that expenditure efficiency across new EU member 
states is rather diverse, especially compared to the group of top performing emerging markets 
in Asia. From the analysis of composite public sector performance (PSP) and efficiency (PSE) 
scores we find that countries with lean public sectors and public expenditure ratios not far 
from 30% of GDP tend to be most efficient. PSE scores of the most efficient countries are 
more than twice as high as those of the poorest performers. 
 
From the DEA results we see that a small set of countries define or are very close to 
the theoretical production possibility frontier: Singapore, Thailand, Cyprus, Korea, and 
Ireland. From an input perspective the highest ranking country uses 1/3 of the input  that the 
bottom ranking one uses to attain a certain PSP score. The average input scores suggest that 
countries could use around 45 per cent less resources to attain the same outcomes if they were 
fully efficient. Average output scores suggest that countries are only delivering around 2/3 of 
the output they could deliver if they were on the efficiency frontier. 
 
Finally we examine via Tobit analysis the influence of non-discretionary factors, 
notably non-fiscal variables, on expenditure efficiency. The study shows that per-capita 
income, public sector competence and education levels as well as the security of property 
rights seem to facilitate the prevention of inefficiencies in the public sector. 
 
From a policy perspective, one should be careful to draw overly strong conclusions 
and we have referred to a number of caveats in the course of the paper. Nevertheless, it is 
apparent that many new members states and other emerging markets can still considerably 
increase the efficiency of public spending by improving the outcomes and by restraining the 
resource use. The final econometric analysis also suggests that high education levels, a 
competent civil service and the security of property rights seem to provide an “extra boost” to 












Afonso, A. and Fernandes, S. (2006). “Local Government Spending Efficiency: DEA 
Evidence for the Lisbon Region”, Regional Studies, 40 (1), 39-53. 
 
Afonso, A. and Gaspar, V. (2005). “Excess burden and the cost of inefficiency in public 
services provision,” mimeo, November. 
 
Afonso, A.; Schuknecht, L. and Tanzi, V. (2005). “Public Sector Efficiency: An International 
Comparison,” Public Choice, 123 (3-4), 321-347. 
 
Afonso, A.; Ebert, W.; Schuknecht, L. and Thöne, M. (2005). “Quality of public finances and 
growth,” European Central Bank, Working Paper n. 438. 
 
Afonso, A. and St. Aubyn (2005a). “Non-parametric Approaches to Education and Health 
Efficiency in OECD Countries,” Journal of Applied Economics, 8 (2), 227-246. 
 
Afonso, A. and St. Aubyn (2005b). “Cross-country Efficiency of Secondary Education 
Provision: a Semi-parametric Analysis with Non-discretionary Inputs,” European Central 
Bank, Working Paper n. 494.  
 
Alesina, A. (1998). “The Political Economy of Macroeconomic Stabilization and Income 
Inequality: Myths and Reality”, in Tanzi, V. and Chu, K.-Y. (eds.), Income Distribution and 
High-Quality Growth. Cambridge and London, MIT Press. 
 
Aninat, E.; Bauer, A. and Cowan, K. (1999). “Addressing Equity in Policymaking: Lessons 
from the Chilean Experience” in Tanzi, V.; Chu, K. and Gupta, S. (eds.) Economic Policy and 
Equity, IMF. 
 
Buti, M. and van den Noord, P. (2003). “What is the Impact of Tax and Welfare Reforms on 
Fiscal Stabilisers? A Simple Model and an Application to EMU,” European Economy – 
Economic Papers, 187. 
 
Charnes, A.; Cooper, W. and Rhodes, E. (1978). “Measuring the efficiency of decision 
making units,” European Journal of Operational Research, 2 (6), 429–444. 
 
Clements, B. (2002). “How Efficient is Education Spending in Europe?” European Review of 
Economics and Finance, 1 (1), 3-26. 
 
Coelli, T.; Rao, D. and Battese, G. (2002). “An Introduction to Efficiency and Productivity 
Analysis”, 6
th edition, Massachusetts, Kluwer Academic Publishers. 
 
Cuaresma, C.; Reitschuler, G. and Sillgoner, M. (2004). “The Fiscal Smile – On the 
Effectinveness and Limits of Fiscal Stabilisers”, Money Macro and Finance Research Group, 
87. 
 
De Borger, B.; Kerstens, K.; Moesen, W. and Vanneste, J. (1994). “Explaining differences in 




Working Paper Series No. 581
January 2006 
De Borger, B. and Kerstens, K. (1996). “Cost efficiency of Belgian local governments: A 
comparative analysis of FDH, DEA, and econometric approaches”, Regional Science and 
Urban Economics, 26, 145-170. 
  
Deprins, D., Simar, L., and Tulkens, H. (1984). “Measuring labor-efficiency in post offices,” 
in: Marchand, M.; Pestieau, P. and Tulkens, H. (Eds.), The performance of public enterprises: 
concepts and measurement. Amsterdam: North-Holland. 
 
Fakin, B. and de Crombrugghe, A. (1997). “Fiscal adjustment in transition economies: social 
transfers and the efficiency of public spending: a comparison with OECD countries,” Policy 
Research Working Paper 1803). Washington, DC: World Bank. 
 
Farrell, M. (1957). “The Measurement of Productive Efficiency”, Journal of the Royal 
Statistical Society Series A (General), 120 (3), 253-281. 
 
Gupta, S. and Verhoeven, M. (2001). “The efficiency of government expenditure Experiences 
from Africa,” Journal of Policy Modelling 23, 433– 467. 
 
Heller, P. (2003). Who Will Pay? Coping with Aging Societies, Climate Change and Other 
Long Term Fiscal Challenges. Washington D.C.: IMF. 
 
Joumard, I., Kongsrud, P., Nam, Y.-S. and Price, R. (2004). “Enhancing the Effectiveness of 
Public Spending: Experience in OECD Countries”, OECD Economics Department Working 
Paper 380.  
 
Leibenstein, H. (1966). “Allocative Efficiency vs. 'X-Efficiency,” American Economic 
Review, 56 (3), 392-415. 
 
Murillo-Zamorano, L. (2004). “Economic Efficiency and Frontier Techniques,” Journal of 
Economic Surveys, 18 (1), 33-77. 
 
OECD (2003). “Enhancing the Cost Effectiveness of Public Spending,” in Economic Outlook, 
vol. 2003/02, n. 74, December, OECD. 
 
Schuknecht, L. and Tanzi, V. (2005). “Reforming public expenditure in industrialised 
countries: are there trade-offs”, European Central Bank, Working Paper n. 435. 
 
Sengupta, J. (2000). Dynamic and Stochastic Efficiency Analysis – Economics of Data 
Envelopment Analysis, World Scientific, Singapore. 
 
Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R. (1998). The Grabbing Hand: Government Pathologies and their 
Cures, Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 
 
Simar, L. and Wilson, P. (2003). Efficiency analysis: the statistical approach, lecture notes, 
January. 
 
St. Aubyn, M. (2003). “Evaluating Efficiency in the Portuguese Education Sector”, 
Economia, 26, 25-51. 
 
Tanzi, V. (1974). “Redistributing Income through the Budget in Latin America", Banca 
Nazionale del Lavoro, Quarterly Review, March. 
44
ECB
Working Paper Series No. 581
January 2006 
 
Tanzi, V. (1998). “Government Role and the Efficiency of Policy Instruments,” in Sorenson. 
P.  (ed.) Public Finance in a Changing World, Macmillan Press, 51-79. 
 
Tanzi, V. and Prakash, T. (2003). “The Cost of Government and the Misuse of  Public 
Assets”, in Public Finance in Developing and Transitional Countries, Essays in Honor of 
Richard Bird, edited by Jorge Martinez-Vazques and James Alm. (Edgar), pp. 129-145. 
 
Tanzi, V. and Schuknecht, L. (1997). “Reconsidering the Fiscal Role of Government: The 
International Perspective,” American Economic Review, 87 (2), 164-168. 
 
Tanzi, V. and Schuknecht, L. (2000). Public Spending in the 20
th Century: A Global 
Perspective, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Thanassoulis, E. (2001). Introduction to the Theory and Application of Data Envelopment 
Analysis, Kluwer Academic Publishers. 
 
Tulkens, H. (1993). “On FDH analysis: some methodological issues and applications to retail 
banking, courts and urban transit,” Journal of Productivity Analysis 4, 183– 210. 
 
Van den Eeckhaut, P., Tulkens, H., and Jamar, M.-A. (1993). “Cost-efficiency in Belgian 
municipalities,” in Fried, H.; Lovell, C. and Schmidt, S. (eds.), The Measurement of 































Working Paper Series No. 581
January 2006 
Annex – Data and sources 
 
Annex Table A – Primary data for performance sub-indicators 
 
  1/ 2/ 3/ 4/ 5/ 6/ 7/ 8/ 9/  10/  11/  12/  13/  14/ 
Brazil  4.6 2.8 3.9 4.6 3.3 68.3 31.0 60.7 1.41 220.9 2.6 7.6  7360 71.3
Bulgaria  5.5 2.5 2.7 5.2 5.0 71.7 14.0 26.4 0.14 139.0 0.7  14.6  6890 87.6
Chile  6.3 3.1 4.6 2.4 3.6 75.8 10.0 56.7 1.43 5.5 4.6 7.9  9190 74.5
Cyprus                78.0 5.0   2.31 3.0 4.0  3.2  21190 88.3
Czech  Republic  5.2 2.7 4.2 2.6 5.5 74.9 4.0 25.4 0.97 6.0 2.1 7.0  14720 87.1
Estonia  5.9 4.2 5.3 2.1 5.5 70.6 11.0 37.6 1.26 13.7 4.3  10.6  10170 82.8
Greece  4.8 2.4 4.7 3.5 4.6 78.0 5.0 32.7 3.91 5.4 3.3 10.3  17440 87.4
Hungary  5.8 2.7 4.9 2.3 5.7 71.5 8.0 24.4 2.64 14.2 3.5 7.8  12340 87.2
Ireland  6.0 3.4 5.2 2.3 5.3 76.6 6.0 35.9 2.53 3.1 7.9 7.8  32410 85.8
Korea  5.3 3.2 4.1 2.8 4.7 73.6 5.0 31.6 1.08 4.1 5.4 3.7  15090 90.9
Latvia  4.9 3.7 4.2 3.6 4.8 70.4 17.0 32.4 1.66 10.4 4.7  12.9  7730 74.4
Lithuania  5.5 2.8 3.3 2.4 5.2 72.7 8.0 32.4 0.63 15.4 3.4 8.4  8470 88.6
Malta  6.1 2.9 5.3 3.0 4.9 78.2 5.0   1.47 2.7 3.8 5.2  13160 79.2
Mauritius  4.6 2.2 4.4 3.3 4.2 72.1 17.0   3.26 6.3 4.8 7.3  9860 64.2
Mexico  5.0 2.3 3.3 5.0 3.1 73.4 24.0 53.1 0.70 15.5 2.7 3.1  8430 59.7
Poland  4.8 2.8 3.9 3.7 4.7 73.5 8.0 31.6 2.10 13.2 4.3  13.7  9450 90.9
Portugal  5.8 2.8 5.7 3.0 3.2 75.8 5.0 38.5 1.53 3.3 2.6 5.7  18150 85.2
Romania  3.6 2.0 2.4 5.5 5.9 69.9 19.0 31.1 0.46 58.5 2.1 9.3  5830 79.6
Singapore  6.7 5.1 5.2 1.4 6.5 78.4 3.0 42.5 1.06 1.1 5.1 3.2  22680 74.3
Slovak  Republic  5.2 2.2 3.2 1.6 5.6 73.2 8.0 19.5 2.58 8.4 4.2  15.7  11960 74.9
Slovenia  5.8 2.8 4.3 2.0 5.3 75.6 4.0 28.4 3.61 9.7 4.1 7.3  17130 88.6
South  Africa  4.9 2.9 5.6 4.5 2.8 47.1 56.0 59.3 2.90 7.3 2.8  25.3  11290 57.2
Thailand  5.1 3.2 4.8 3.7 4.5 69.0 24.0 41.4 0.58 3.6 3.4 3.0  6400 79.8
Turkey  4.1 2.5 3.7 5.7 4.0 69.8 36.0 41.5 0.46 69.8 2.8 7.2  5890 51.3
Average  5.3 2.9 4.3 3.3 4.7 72.4 13.9 37.3 1.7 26.7 3.7 8.7  12635 78.8
 
1/ Corruption index (1 to 7).  
2/ Red tape (burden of regulation) index (1 to 7, good).  
3/ Quality of judiciary index (1 to 7, good). 
4/ Shadow economy index (1 to 9, bad). We used the following transformation 9-I, where I is the 
shadow economy index. 
5/ Quality of math and science education index. 
6/ Life expectancy at birth, years, 2001.  
7/ Infant mortality rate (IMR), 2001. We used the infant survival rate, ISR=(1000-IMR)/1000. 
8/ Gini coefficient, 2003 or latest year. We used the construction 100-Gini. 
9/ Coefficient of variation (inverse) of average real GDP growth for 1994-2003. 
10/ Average inflation, 1994-2003. We used its inverse. 
11/ Average GDP real growth rate, 1994-2003. 
12/ Average unemployment, 1994-2003. 
13/ Per capita GDP, PPP USD, 2001. 
14/ Secondary school enrolment ratio, 2001 or latest. 
 
Sources: 
1/, 2/, 3/, 4/, 5/ - Global Competitiveness Report, 2003/2004 edition. 
6/, 7/, 13/, 14/ - World Bank, WDI 2003. 
8/ - World Bank, World Development Report, 2003 edition. 
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Brazil 7360  5.0  2.4  71.3  29.15  2.2  4.51 
Bulgaria 6890  3.2  3.3  87.6  116.20  2.3  
Chile 9190  5.6  2.1  74.5  69.15  2.9  6.64 
Cyprus 21190     88.3  95.53     
Czech Republic  14720  4.4  2.3 87.1  126.64 1.9  3.60 
Estonia 10170  4.8  3.0  82.8  156.22  2.8  5.96 
Greece 17440  5.0  1.8  87.4 48.59  2.5  3.45 
Hungary 12340  5.3  2.8  87.2  131.49  2.6  3.50 
Ireland 32410  6.1  3.6  85.8  151.31  3.2  5.47 
Korea 15090  4.7  3.0  90.9  73.51  2.1  4.21 
Latvia 7730  4.3  3.1  74.4  97.51  2.3   
Lithuania 8470  4.2  3.4  88.6  109.46  1.9   
Malta 13160      79.2  163.55     
Mauritius 9860  5.4  2.6  64.2  115.24  2.6   
Mexico 8430  4.6  2.6  59.7  57.30  2.5  4.53 
Poland 9450  4.6  2.7  90.9  71.28  2.4  2.21 
Portugal 18150  5.3  2.2  85.2  66.59  3.2  5.09 
Romania 5830  4.5  2.6  79.6  80.38  3.1  3.23 
Slovak Republic  11960  5.2  2.0  74.9  156.87  2.8  4.28 
Slovenia 17130  4.8  3.4  88.6  112.97  3.0  3.70 
South Africa  11290  5.3  1.9  57.2  53.69  2.9  6.05 
Thailand 6400    2.6  79.8  124.31  2.8  5.66 
Turkey 5890  4.2  2.1  51.3  58.05  1.9  4.43 
 
1/ GDP per capita PPP, 2001, USD.  
2/ Financial assets and wealth are (1=poorly delineated and not protected by law, 7=clearly delineated 
and protected by law), 2001-02.  
3/ The competence of personnel in the public sector is (1=lower than the private sector, 7=higher than 
the private sector). 
4/ Secondary school enrolment, 2001 or latest. 
5/ Degree of openness = (Imports+Exports)/GDP, 2003. 
6/ Public trust in the honesty of politicians is (1=very low, 7=very high) 
7/ Transparency, highest is best, 2003 data. 
 
Sources:  
1/, 4/ - World Bank, WDI 2003. 
2/, 3/, 6/ - World Economic Forum: Global Competitiveness Report 2001-2002. 
5/ - IMF World Economic Outlook (WEO database). 
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